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1 Introduction
“…[A] man going on a journey […] called his servants and entrusted to them his
property. To one he gave ﬁve talents, to another two, to another one, to each
according to his ability. Then he went away.” (Matthew 25: 14–151). The Bible
parable describes the different ways in which the servants used the money and it
also gives an evaluation of the chosen investment strategies, from the perspective of
the returning master.
International comparisons2 portray Romania as a country which needs to improve
both quality and equity in higher education. At the same time, Romania is amongst
the poorest countries in the European Union and invests low percentages of its
national income in higher education. This naturally draws the attention to the morals
of the parable of the talents: how efﬁciently is this money used? We are putting some
old and some new analytical ﬂesh on the equity versus quality dichotomy advanced
in different reports (Vlăsceanu and Dima 2000, 9, Salmi and Hauptman 2006, 92), as
we are trying to understand if Romania’s “talents” are wisely spent.
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This chapter is organised as follows. In the ﬁrst section we discuss the criteria on
which student subsidies are distributed and some of the mechanisms which may
explain the perpetuation of past institutional arrangements. In the second section we
focus on the characteristics of the recipients of the subsidies. Both sections include
explanations of the concepts and methodology we used. In the concluding section
we argue that the current context is more favourable than that of the late nineties for
a more balanced relation between quality and equity in relation to student subsidies.
2 The Distribution of Student Subsidies: Past and Present
Perspectives
A turning point for Romanian higher education was the change of political and
economic regime in 1989–1990. In the early nineties,3 the Romanian universities4
acted in an institutional setting quite similar to that of the previous period. They
continued being ﬁnanced by the state and they were providing schooling free of
charge on a much lower scale than demanded. As Miroiu and Vlăsceanu (2012)
note, “[f]ive to ﬁfteen candidates for one place represented the normal state in the
case of medicine, law, humanities, business or economics programs”, while higher
education attainment level in the overall population continued to be amongst the
lowest in Europe. Private higher education developed in parallel. Although they had
no access to public funds, private universities proliferated: given the huge demand
for higher education, much above the capacities of public universities, they started
to enrol students who were willing to pay tuition fees themselves. The situation
changed in 1998, when public universities started to enrol tuition paying students
on top of the subsidised ones, hence extending their schooling capacities beyond
the limit imposed by the public budget.
The same history, told in ofﬁcial statistics (INS 2013), can be summarised as
follows: university enrolments5 started expanding in the early nineties, reached their
historical maximum in 2007, and decreased substantially afterwards. Enrolments
dropped in 2011/2012 to 60 % of the 2007/2008 peak, with private universities6
suffering most: their enrolments dropped by 65 % between 2008 and 2012 (CNFIS
2013, 18). The evolution of participation rates within the cohort aged 19–24 follows
a similar pattern.
3 This short overview is grounded in the historical account provided in Miroiu and Vlăsceanu
(2012).
4 We will use “universities” in this article, as non-university tertiary education in Romania since
1990 inﬂuences only marginally the dynamics of higher education.
5 According to CNFIS (2013, 8), a statistical overview of physical students in Romania was never
compiled; the available data count separate enrolments even when the same student takes more
than one study programme.
6 The drop in enrolments was signiﬁcantly determined by the evolution of “Spiru Haret”
University. This university had negative press coverage on issuing of diplomas for its unaccredited
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In the nineties, the expansion of higher education was accompanied by an
extension of the beneﬁts to which students were entitled (Vlăsceanu and Dima
2000, 8–9). However, the overall public spending for higher education did not
parallel the evolution of enrolments: Romanian universities have been “chronically
under-ﬁnanced” throughout this period. Between 2003 and 2011, the total funds
allocated to cover the educational expenses of the subsidised students, the so-called
“core funding”, grew in real terms by only 5 %. Subsidies in public higher edu-
cation take many forms: study grants7 or the so called “budgeted positions” within
public universities, scholarships, accommodation facilities in student dormitories,
student cafeterias, public transportation discounts, medical assistance, touristic
packages, and discounts at public cultural institutions8 (e.g., museums). Some of
the subsidies arrive in students’ pockets, as cash (e.g., scholarships). Others take the
form of direct payments for facilities students would have had to pay in the absence
of the subsidy (e.g., part of the food costs in student cafeterias).
We can distinguish universal subsidies, i.e. subsidies to which all students are
entitled, without additional criteria (e.g., free medical assistance), from speciﬁc sub-
sidies that are distributed to a proportion of the students, based on some speciﬁc criteria
(e.g., scholarships). These distribution criteria are extremely interesting for our dis-
cussion, as their conﬁguration can denote the policy preference for equity or quality.
The distinction between these types of subsidies is not very sharp. For example,
when demand exceeds provision, the appropriation of subsidies which are meant to
be universal may be restricted, and distributive criteria are instituted. In-town public
transportation discounts9 are in most cases available on a universal basis, but there
are also cases when demand exceeded the funds allotted and the universities opted
for some criteria of distribution.10
We restrict our discussion to study grants, scholarships and accommodation
facilities in student dormitories. Cumulated, these forms of student support repre-
sent the bulk of the public funds for higher education. Their origins can be traced to
the pre-war period (Berlescu 1960, Berciu-Drăghicescu şi Bozgan 2004, Rados
2010). These three types of subsidy are distributed based on criteria formalised in
ofﬁcial regulations. The empirical part of this section is grounded on our own desk-
(Footnote 6 continued)
study programmes. During the same period, “Spiru Haret” University, although belatedly, imposed
quality assurance measures.
7 The 2011 Education Law established that universities’ teaching costs are to be ﬁnanced through
multiannual study grants. Currently this instrument is used only for the doctoral cycle. We use
“study grants” to refer to the tuition the so-called “budgeted” students would pay in the absence of
the subsidy.
8 Students enrolled in private accredited institutions receive some subsidies, which include public
transport discounts, medical assistance, touristic packages, and discounts at public culture
institutions.
9 The central government pays for 50 % discounts; when the local authorities contribute as well,
the discount can reach 100 %. This is the case in Bucharest or Timisoara. There are also other
arrangements, where students pay a certain per cent of the costs.
10 See for example Adevărul (2010) and Ziua de Cluj (2013).
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research of ofﬁcial regulations and it is complemented by descriptions provided by
Salmi et al. (2014).
2.1 Equity and Quality: Conceptual Clariﬁcations
Equity and quality are often part of the ofﬁcial rhetoric. They look like intuitive
concepts, but their understanding is far from being generally acknowledged.
Reading policy documents requires many times a certain dose of interpretation, as
documents of this type generally do not include conceptual clariﬁcations. The need
for clarity may be more than an academic whim: as Marginson (2011) argues,
different conceptual understandings of equity can generate different, sometimes
conﬂicting evaluations of the corresponding higher education policies.
The lawwhich currently regulates higher education inRomania includes equity and
quality on the ﬁrst places amongst its principles (Law Law 1/2011, Art 3, a) and b)).
Equity is regarded as non-discriminatory access to education, where discrimination is
used in its negative understanding. (Note that the law opens the possibility for afﬁr-
mative action.) Quality is deﬁned by reference to national and international standards
and good practices. The law also refers to excellence and outstanding achievements
which are to be stimulated (Law 1/2011, e.g. Art. 12, par. 3; Art. 223, par. 10).
We deﬁne a funding instrument as geared towards quality when merit-based
logic is prevalent in the associated distributive pattern. While conceding that this
assumption oversimpliﬁes the causal chain, our approach is rooted in the popular
wisdom according to which merit-based competition incentivises achievements,
hence improves overall quality. Salmi and Hauptman (2006, 92) also argue that
merit-based distribution of grants and scholarships improves quality. The Romanian
law refers to this function of the scholarships (Law 1/2011, Art. 223(10)); we can
also expect that such a view is shared by many Romanian policymakers.
We deﬁne a funding instrument as geared towards equity when its distributive
pattern is prevalently sensitive to the individual characteristics which represent
structural inequalities in Romanian higher education.11 The Romanian education law
establishes a set of priorities in terms of equity12: orphans, children from placement
centres, Romanian ethnics from abroad, members of the Roma minority, high-school
graduates from rural areas and from small towns (less than ten thousand inhabitants)
(Law 1/2011, art. 205, pt. 2, 4, and 6).
11 We consider our understanding of equity to be consistent with speciﬁc policies of the European
Commission (Bevc and Uršič 2008), and of the OECD (Field et al. 2007), even though the
terminology may differ.
12 A recent inventory of the inequalities of participation in higher education can be found in Salmi
et al. (2014).
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2.2 Data and Methodology
Data on the distribution of the speciﬁed subsidies is retrieved mainly from two
sources. Data on student population and study grants is retrieved from the National
Council for Financing Higher Education (CNFIS), a buffer organisation with
responsibilities in the ﬁeld. The data cover the entire population, which represents
enrolments in this case. For a numerical perspective on the evolution of scholar-
ships and accommodation facilities in student dormitories we analyse sample data
from the 2011 wave of the longitudinal survey conducted for the “quality barom-
eters” of the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education
(ARACIS) (Vlăsceanu et al. 2011; Păunescu et al. 2011). The respondents of the
2011 wave were bachelor or master students, or graduates of bachelor and master
programme from the 2009 and 2010 waves. Other sources are indicated in the text.
In terms of methodology, we used univariate analysis and we tested the estimates
with the nonparametric chi-square test. We calculated the margin of error for the
0.95 conﬁdence level using the standard formula (Agresti 2007, 9–10).
Where possible, we contrast our ﬁndings with the results of a survey conducted
in 2000, on bachelor students in state and private universities (Vlăsceanu and Dima
2000, 63–65). On one hand, the samples are not exactly identical: the 2000 sample
covers bachelors, while the 2011 one covers both bachelors and masters. On the
other hand, the structure of the studentships was different: in 2000 the Bologna
bachelor-master-doctorate cycles were not implemented; the credentials of pre-
Bologna bachelor are equivalent nowadays to master degrees. The proportion of
the 2000 equivalent of post-bachelor students in the relevant population should be
considerably lower than that of the 2011 master students, as it can be seen in the
Table 1.
Due to these reasons we consider that the two surveys have a considerable
degree of overlap. We also note here that both data bases contain self-declarations.
We underline that we do not strictly compare the estimates of the 2000 and 2011
survey; we rather present the ﬁgures advanced on the basis of the 2000 survey as
references for the interplay between student support policy options and inequalities
in higher education, not as an accurate statistical comparison. We also use the 2000
estimates as references for some of the chi-tests.
2.3 Study Grants: Criteria
The post-1989 students fall under two categories: (1) tuition paying; and (2) state
subsidised, or “budgeted” students. The state covers costs of education for only a
part of the students enrolled in public universities through direct transfers to the
universities, as the major component of the public funding. We will refer to the
subsidised students as beneﬁciaries of study grants. Private universities receive no
budget for education costs from the state, and therefore their students cannot
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appropriate study grants under the arrangements we discuss here. We underline that
there is no intermediary category of students, whose costs of education are covered
partially by the state, or from another source. An agency responsible for student
loans was set up in 2009 as an alternative ways to ﬁnance higher education (Cabinet
Ordinance 5/2009), but student loans were still ineffective at this writing.
The value of a study grant is calculated by a special body (the National Higher
Education Funding Council—CNFIS) based on a sophisticated formula, and it
varies with the ﬁeld of study, the study cycle, the teaching language as well as the
quality13 of the study programme offered by an university (Miroiu and Vlăsceanu
2012, 795–800). Irrespective of the calculated value of the study grants, students
are not supposed to pay additional money out of their own pockets to cover their
tuition fees.14 Therefore study grants can be seen as the only instrument for cov-
ering the costs of tuition in Romania. Study grants have a rather abstract character,
given the fact that the money value of the grant does not ﬂow through the recipient
students’ bank accounts.
Each study programme is allotted a certain number of study grants, the so called
“budgeted positions”. The norm is that “budgeted positions” for ﬁrst year students
are “occupied” on the basis of the entrance examinations results. Universities are
free to decide their entrance requirements and procedures, but they are bound to
distribute the ﬁrst year study grants on the basis of the admittance results (MEN
2013). For the subsequent years, the norm is that the study grants are distributed on
the basis of students’ academic results in the previous year. Quotas for Roma
minority and for Romanian ethnics from Moldova and the Balkans have a separate
regime. Exceptionally, study grants are distributed as a form of afﬁrmative action to
socially disadvantaged students. We have identiﬁed also exceptions from the
general rule of yearly re-distribution based on merit: at the Technical University in










1999–2000 463,507 98 2
2009–2010a . 914,530 85 15
a Data for private universities for the academic years after 2010 were not published
13 Until 2011, the ﬁnancing methodologies contained the so-called “quality indicators”, discussed
at length in Vîiu and Miroiu (2014). The ranking of study programmes instituted by the 2011
Education Law was intended to provide indicators for the quantiﬁcation of quality.
14 In practice, universities charge administrative fees to budgeted students as well. The evidence
collected by ANOSR (2010) indicates that the value and types of such “hidden taxes” presents
ample ﬂuctuations, but it generally represents a small fraction of the value of the tuition.
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Cluj the students who are considered disadvantaged according to a set of social
standards15 keep their study grants if they accumulate enough ECTS credits to pass
the year (UTCN 2012).
2.4 Study Grants: A Historical Perspective
According to CNFIS data, the number of study grants has almost doubled in the
nineties, it reached a high plateau delimited by two maximum points in 1999/00 and
2002/03. Afterwards the data manifests a decreasing tendency, but the values
remained high. The data for tuition paying students has a parabolic shape, with the
maximum in 2007/08. It intersects the study grants’ line in 2010/11. A CNFIS
report argues that the number of study grants reﬂects some past equilibrium from a
period when enrolments were higher; both enrolments and secondary education
graduations dropped, but the number of study grants did not drop proportionally,
resulting in lowering the percentage of tuition paying students (CNFIS 2013, 47)
(Fig. 1).
The present situation inherits many characteristics from the last decades of the
communist regime, when higher education was entirely state-provided and tuition-
free, but under-dimensioned in relation to the demand. The distribution of study
grants and academic admittance and progression were perfectly aligned.
As early as 1993 public universities were allowed to enrol additional students
willing to pay the tuition fees. Following the enforcement of the new regulation,16 a
small debate emerged in the public sphere. Some argued that the number of state-
budgeted students was extremely restrictive, and that public universities were able
to offer more education for young people above the state support. However, the
view that state education must be free became compelling, and soon the Cabinet
decided to subsidise entirely all students. It was only in 1998 when public uni-
versities started again to enrol students who paid themselves the tuition fee. During
the ﬁrst years of co-habitation between “budgeted” and tuition paying students,
study grants were distributed based on the admittance score and they were kept until
graduation, provided the student passed the year. Practically, budgeted and tuition-
paying students were offered the same education, but the rules governing the
funding of their education costs where different, and did not allow for transfers
between the two categories. The rules governing the ﬁnancing of budgeted students
were inherited from a completely public, free-of-charge higher education, while
15 Students are considered disadvantaged if they fulﬁll at least one of the following criteria: (1) are
orphans or come from placement centers or child care; (2) come from single parent families and
their income per family member is lower than the minimum wage; and (3) come from families with
more than one student at all levels of education and their income per family member is lower than
the minimum wage.
16 See http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=13686.
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tuition-paying students were following rules resembling the arrangements in private
universities.17
The rule of reshufﬂing study grants after the end of each academic year repre-
sented a notable (and the single!) departure from the initial stage of institutional
amalgamation. Yet it preserved the sharp distinction between students who receive
full support and students who get no support to cover tuition fees. Moreover, it
preserved merit as the staple criterion of evaluation, and in theory it should have
provided a strong incentive to reward the better students. An attempt to change the
status quo was associated with the implementation of the new law on education
passed through the Parliament in 2011. The main proponent of the change was
Cătălin Baba, minister of education in the M.R. Ungureanu cabinet. He proposed to
allow universities to decide on the number and the value of study grants, as well as
on the criteria according to which they were to be distributed to students, within the
budget allocated. (Clearly, this approach leaves room for criteria other than merit.)
One of his most important proposals was to allow universities to offer students full
or only partial study grants.18 As a result, the state support a student could have
received would have covered only a part of the tuition fee. However, with the fall of
the Ungureanu Cabinet in May 2012, the proposed changes were abandoned.
Fig. 1 Study grants and tuition paying students in public universities (1990–2012). Data sources:
CNFIS and the ministry responsible for higher education
17 We have identiﬁed few public universities in which tuition-paying students are still not eligible
for scholarships or where subsidised students are still given priority in the distribution of other
subsidies (places in student dormitories or in-town transportation discounts).
18 See for example http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/soc-in-facultati-studii-cu-bani-de-acasa-975224.
html?utm_source=export&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=b13. The idea of introducing partial
study grants was ﬁrst presented in Miroiu (2005).
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The sources of ﬁnancing higher education expenses in the arrangements we have
described above are public, i.e., subsidies, or private, i.e., contributions from stu-
dents and their families. In the context of this dichotomy both policy-makers and
researchers19 have advanced the alternative of student loans. In fact, student loans
have been instituted on paper in early 1998–1999 (Cabinet Ordinance 105/1998,
Law 193/1999). We underline that one of the mandatory requirements to receive a
student loan was that the applicant’s income per family member should be lower
than the minimum wage in the economy. Another criterion was that the applicant
should have passed all exams from previous years. The student loan was instituted
with reference to both equity and quality thresholds. The legislation was, however,
ineffective (Explanatory Memorandum 2009) and another attempt to alter the sta-
tus-quo was made in 2007, when the Romanian authorities requested the assistance
of the World Bank in setting up an operational student loans system. Following the
recommendations of the international experts, a designated agency was set up in
2009 (Cabinet Ordinance 5/2009), but this step proved to be insufﬁcient as well.
Shortly after its set up, the agency was given additional responsibilities to manage
some very speciﬁc scholarships, which reach very few students (Cabinet Decision
1402/2009), while student loans are still ineffective as of this writing.20
To conclude, the merit-based distribution of study grants and their alignment
with the entrance examination represented a central policy option; while needs-
sensitive alternatives have been considered, they would have departed considerably
from the status quo and were not adopted. Another alternative that promised to alter
signiﬁcantly the existing situation was the setting up of a student loan system.
Although the legislative framework for student loans was ﬁrstly established in
1998–1999 and was followed by other attempts of institutionalisation, the system is
still ineffective. For nearly a quarter of a century, the Romanian higher education
has been experiencing only incremental changes in the ﬁnancing of higher edu-
cation expenses, mostly limited to minor adjustments in the distribution of study
grants.
2.5 Scholarships
The legislative framework which institutes scholarships in Romanian universities is
heavily prescriptive, detailed and not coherent in some of its aspects.21 The most
common and long-lived types of scholarships are merit-based scholarships and the
so called “social scholarships”, which are needs-based. Both types (partially) cover
19 See Voicu (2007), Vlăsceanu and Dima (2000).
20 See http://www.roburse.ro/agentia.php, accessed in September, 19th, 2013.
21 The legislative acts which regulate these types of scholarships are The Education Law (1/2011)
and the Cabinet Decision 558/1998. An example of incoherence is the different deﬁnitions they
provide to needs, in the context of equity approaches.
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the students’ living expenses. The legislative frame establishes the categories of
students eligible for social scholarships, as well as some general guidelines for the
categories of merit-based scholarships. Merit is understood as academic achieve-
ment and outstanding performance in the ﬁeld of study. A more detailed description
of the categories of scholarships can be found in Salmi et al. (2014). Universities
are allowed to decide on how many scholarships to distribute within each type, and
on the value of each type of scholarship. The government allots a single budget line
for all types of scholarships and the universities have the freedom to supplement it.
The distribution methodologies are also up to the universities. Universities can
decide to award other types of scholarships from their own funds.22
A report conducted by CNFIS (2011) found that in 2011 all the surveyed uni-
versities allotted to needs-based scholarship the smallest value among all types of
scholarships. The average needs-based scholarship amounted to 184 lei, which
represented only 32 % of the estimated monthly expenses on meals and accom-
modation. On average, the highest value a student could cumulate from needs and
merit-based scholarships amounted to 87 % of the estimated costs for accommo-
dation and meals.
We calculated the proportions associated with each type of scholarship in the
2011 data base. The estimates and the corresponding margins of error for a 0.95
conﬁdence level can be found in the Table 2. We added to the table the values
estimated by Vlăsceanu and Dima, for the academic year 1999–2000 (2000, 24).
Two observations are immediate: (1) the proportion of students who receive a
form of merit-based scholarship is substantially higher than that of the beneﬁciaries
of needs-based scholarships, and (2) in 2011 scholarships were distributed on a
more extended scale than in 2000, both in terms of numbers and of the proportions
of the students who appropriated them.
If students from private universities are excluded from the analysis, we obtain23
the following proportions and the corresponding margins of error for the 0.95
conﬁdence level: 32.0 ± 2.1 % of the students received a form of scholarship.
27.1 ± 2.0 % of the students received a form of merit-based scholarship, while a
mere 4.9 ± 1.0 % of them received needs based scholarships.
A brief review of the history of post-1989 higher education in Romania reveals
that the scholarships’ orientation towards quality has resisted reform attempts. In
1996 the Romanian Government received a loan from the World Bank under a
project24 aimed to support the overall goals of the Government’s program for
reforming higher education. One of the main objectives was to improve access to
higher education for talented but needy students, while mitigating the adverse
22 For example, a partnership of three universities (“Al. I. Cuza” University in Iaşi , Babes-Bolyai
University in Cluj and West University in TimiŞoara) grant scholarships for female master
students. See http://www.rsf.uaic.ro/index.php/component/content/article/47, accessed on August
4, 2013.
23 The null hypothesis was rejected (the proportions for public universities do not differ from the
proportions corresponding to both public and private universities), p < 0.001, valid cases: 1471.
24 The project was entitled The Reform of Higher Education and Research Project.
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consequences of relying on cost recovery schemes. It was recommended to shift the
allocation of student support from an approach based to a major extent on merit to a
combination of need- and merit-based allocation. The target was to allocate no less
than 20 % of the scholarships to needy but talented students, while limiting the
threshold for merit-exclusive scholarships to only 3 % of overall student support
budget (World Bank 1996, 94).
However, these recommendations have never been implemented.25 A Cabinet
Decision which included the move to a need- and merit-based approach in allo-
cating the scholarships was presented to the Isărescu Cabinet in November 2000,
but was not approved. Meanwhile, student associations (consisting mainly of stu-
dents in public universities) ﬁercely opposed the change (World Bank 2003, 6).
The different points discussed above converge to the conclusion that scholar-
ships have been distributed preponderantly on merit since the early nineties. A
central policy alternative that departed considerably from the status quo was
opposed on several fronts, especially by some of the student representatives.
However, the context in which the revision had been considered was signiﬁcantly
different compared to the current context: needs-based approaches were quite fre-
quently labelled an expression of communist mentality,26 while the student or-
ganisations which opposed change were operating in some of the public
universities, where tuition fees were not implemented at that moment.















1999–2000 20 ± 2.0 92 701 ± 9270 18 ± 1.9 2 ± 0.7
2010–2011 27.6 ± 2.0 246 923 ± 18
291a
23.5 ± 1.9 4.1 ± 0.9
The null hypothesis was rejected (reference: Vlăsceanu and Dima (2000, 24)), p < 0.001, valid
cases: 1778
a Again we lacked data corresponding to academic year 2010–2011; we used data corresponding
to 2009–2010 instead
25 As noted by the World Bank (2003, 16) in 2003 the scholarship scheme was only slightly
revised. The adjustment consisted in extending the allocation for needs-based scholarships to 30 %
of the total funds for scholarships.
26 In fact, the actions undertaken in Romanian universities during the communist period
represented an extreme form of afﬁrmative action, often marked by illiberal approaches. In the late
forties and the early ﬁfties measures were taken to increase participation rates for students from
worker and peasant families: entrance quotas, limited access to non-vocational faculties for the
ones with so-called “unhealthy social origin”, differentiated routes to graduation, etc. (Bozgan
2004, Vese 2012).
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2.6 Accommodation
Universities’ regulations regarding the distribution of accommodation facilities
contain references to both merit and needs. Moreover, some universities chose to
prioritise different categories of students in the distribution of accommodation
facilities, which include: married students (The Baptist Institute in Bucharest),
children of employees in the public education system (“Ştefan cel Mare” University
in Suceava), student representatives (“Babeş-Bolyai” University in Cluj, Craiova
University), international students (“Transilvania” University in Braşov), students
with achievements in sports (The University of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine
in Cluj), etc.
Vlăsceanu and Dima (2000, 27) estimated that 28 ± 2.8 % of the students were
living in dormitories in 2000. They identiﬁed a decreasing tendency in regards to
the percentage of students who beneﬁt from such accommodation facilities, from 50
% in 1994.27 Our estimate28 based on survey data for 2011 suggests that 37 ± 2.2 %
of the students in both public and private universities receive such beneﬁts.
An additional detail is necessary to complete the perspective: we estimate that
42 ± 2.3 % of the total population of the 2011 students lived either with their
parents, or in their own apartments. If we equalise the maximal unsatisﬁed demand
with the percentage of students who rent or have other living arrangements, then
64 ± 2.2 % of the overall demand was satisﬁed in 2011; for public universities the
demand was satisﬁed in a proportion of 68 ± 2.1 %.
If the current tendency of decreasing enrolments continues, we can expect the
demand to be satisﬁed in even higher proportions. This situation can be explained
as a consequence of the past decade investments in infrastructure, which were
dimensioned to enrolments in the maximal range.
2.7 The Appropriation of Student Subsidies: A Statistical
Perspective
The literature we reviewed provides snapshots of inequalities of participation in
higher education at different moments starting from the early nineties until recently
(EACEA et al. 2012, 78, Vlăsceanu et al. 2011, 133, 277–278, Voicu 2007, 23,
Vlăsceanu and Dima 2000, Pasti 1998, 43–44, 145–148). The conclusions of these
various studies indicate that family background—i.e., parents’ education, parents’
residence in rural or urban localities, and income per family member—had a
27 This tendency may result from the increase in the number of students in public universities in
the period. Due to lack of resources, the number of places in dormitories roughly remained
constant in the nineties.
28 The null hypothesis was rejected (Vlăsceanu and Dima (2000, 24)), p < 0.001, valid cases:
1791.
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substantial and pervasive impact on participation in Romanian higher education.
The policy reports we have consulted provide converging images e.g. (MECTS
(2012, 12), Jongbloed et al. (2010, 510)).
Research on recent years’ cohorts points to the fact that some of the past dis-
crepancies in terms of participation rates tended to decrease as enrolments expan-
ded. Voicu and Vasile (2010) argue that rural-urban attainment inequalities
decreased considerably between 2000 and 2006.29 The tendency they identify
interrupts a previously stable trend of increasing inequalities which started in the
early seventies and culminated in the nineties. Vlăsceanu et al. (2011) found that 67
% of the 2010 students come from families whose level of education is lower than
higher education and interpreted their estimates as indication of ascendant social
mobility.
We have also reviewed the literature on the contribution of student subisidies to
the reproduction of the social structure within higher education. Pasti (1998) argued
that study grants’ distribution contributed to the escalation of the social inequalities
in higher education. He concluded that the ﬁnancing of higher education repre-
sented a state policy which redistributed income from the poorer parts of the
population to the wealthiest 20 % (Pasti 1998, 43–44). Vlăsceanu and Dima (2000,
24–25) found that scholarships were generally serving to top up the income of the
better off students, serving rather as “extra pocket money”. They also found that
the composition of the student body resembled the social structure of the wealthiest
two deciles of the Romanians (Vlăsceanu and Dima 2000, 25). Their ﬁndings
indicate that the distribution of study grants increased inequalities in higher
education.
In this second part of the article we assess the proportions in which the categories
of students deﬁned by the three “equity” variables appropriate student subsidies. We
explore which categories of students are “over- and under-represented” as beneﬁ-
ciaries of student subsidies. In this respect we take as reference the estimates of the
proportions in which the categories deﬁned by the three variables are represented in
the overall student cohort. Our aim is to understand the contribution of the current
arrangements regarding student subsidies to the dynamics of the inequalities in
Romanian higher education.
2.8 Data
The analysis is carried out on the survey data we used to discuss the numerical
evolution of scholarships and accommodation facilities in the previous part of the
article.
29 The authors warn that the methodology they use may overestimate attainment rates for student
with a rural background for the period between 2000 and 2006.
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2.9 Variables
We constructed the independent variables as indicators of students’ socio-economic
background: residence (rural-urban), parents’ education and income.
Parents’ education is seen as being determinant for the social class and family
income (Voicu and Vasile 2010, 17) and it is used as predictor for the reproduction
of the social structure (Vlăsceanu et al. 2011, Vlăsceanu and Dima 2000, Voicu and
Rusu 2011, 143–147). We deﬁned parents’ education as a dichotomous variable.
We labelled “higher education” the cases where at least one of the parents has
graduated a bachelor programme or higher. The rest of the cases are labelled
“lower”. We discarded the cases in which there was no valid answer for any of the
parents, or where one parent’s level of education was below higher education and
there was no valid answer for the other. The latter cases could belong to both of the
deﬁned categories.
Rural-urban inequalities are seen as pervasive in Romanian higher education,
due to a complex set of factors which include the low quality and inaccessibility of
secondary education in rural areas, the physical distance from universities, and due
to other factors related to the context of the family (Voicu and Vasile 2010, 11). We
deﬁned rural-urban background as a dichotomous variable, where “rural” stands for
the cases in which parents live in rural areas and “urban” represents the rest of the
cases. Alternative deﬁnitions are used in the literature e.g. the previously quoted
authors distinguish rural from urban students on grounds of their place of birth. Our
deﬁnition is similar to that of the 2011 national census30 and our option is grounded
on issues of data comparability. We removed orphans and students whose parents
live in another country.
Family income is relevant not only from the perspective of the social back-
ground, but also because the strength of material incentives is in theory affected by
the available ﬁnancial resources. The only variable in the 2011 data base which
referred to income was the monthly personal income. We removed the cases which
corresponded to graduates which were questioned in the 2009 and 2011 waves, as
their monthly income at the time of answering the questionnaire, mostly from
salaries, are irrelevant for the distribution of students according to income. We also
removed three cases, whose declarations were implausible.31 We note that the
declared personal income is not necessarily equal to the income per capita, which is
the variable used in ofﬁcial statistics and in the 2000 survey. Therefore, the pro-
portions we estimate cannot be compared with Vlăsceanu and Dima’s (2000)
estimates, nor with the income distribution in Romania’s population.
We constructed the dependent variables as dichotomous variables which
describe if the respondent beneﬁts from student subsidies or not. We analyse the
30 http://www.recensamantromania.ro/rezultate-2/ , Accessed on the 25th of September, 2013.
31 One respondent declared an income of 1 RON, while two declared they were receiving a form
of scholarship, but their personal declared income was lower than the minimum scholarship
calculated by CNFIS (2011).
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distribution of the subsidies described in the ﬁrst part of the article: study grants,
scholarships and accommodation. We are interested only in those students who are
eligible to receive the subsidies, therefore we removed from the sample the
responses corresponding to students from private universities. We analysed only
the appropriation of merit-based scholarship, as the “social scholarships” is sup-
posed to be appropriated exclusively by needy students. We kept in the sample the
recipients of needs-based scholarships, as their removal would have modiﬁed the
proportions within the reference population.
2.10 Methodology and Results
We opted for using bivariate analysis, plus the chi-square test and the calculation of
margins of error for the 0.95 conﬁdence level. In the construction of the null
hypotheses we opted for two different approaches: one for the dichotmous variables
(parents’ education and parents’ residence) and one for the declared personal
income (numerical variable).
For the dichotomous variables, we ﬁrstly estimated the distributions within
public universities. According to our calculations, 17.6 ± 1.7 % of the students in
public universities are coming from rural areas. For reference, the proportion of the
19–25 population who is recorded as living in rural localities reaches 42.7 %,
according to according to ofﬁcial data (INS 2013). We estimate that 62.8 ± 2.2 % of
the students are from parents without higher education, while 88 % of the adult
population did not graduate higher education, according to Voicu and Rusu (2011,
144). We used the references for the overall population as null hypotheses for chi-
square tests; the calculations are presented in the Table 3. Our estimates indicate
that the least well off categories are under-represented amongst students of public
universities,32 in relation to both parents’ residence and parents’ higher education
attainment. The results are highly signiﬁcant.
In the second stage we estimated the proportions in which each category deﬁned
by the two “equity” variables appropriates the subsidies. We tested the estimates
using chi-square tests, where the null hypothesis is that each category deﬁned by the
two variables appropriates subsidies in proportions equal to their share in the stu-
dent cohort within public universities. The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
We opted for a different sequence of operations for the income variable. We
transformed the numerical variable in a categorical one, by splitting the data into
quintiles.33 The percentages associated with each quintile and values’ range are
32 We note that the inclusion of students from private universities in the sample does not change
signiﬁcantly the situation: the estimate for the proportion of students from parents living in urban
areas is 16.2 ± 1.7%, while the ﬁgure for the proportion of students from parents who did not attain
higher education is 62.9 ± 2.2%.
33 We use “quintile” to refer to the sets of data delimited by the values of the quintiles.
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p < 0.001
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presented in the table below. For informative purpose we also included in the
Table 6 the distribution according to parents’ residence and parents’ education.
We note that most probably the data does not reﬂect in-kind income. The
questionnaire did not include qualitative questions on how costs associated with
being a student are covered. However, it is a common strategy that students receive
other forms of in-kind support from their families, such as food, clothing or pay-
ment of telephone bills, which are not reﬂected in the current data. Therefore,
probably the values corresponding to at least the lowest quintile would grow if these
forms of in-kind support are included.
Following the transformation of the variable, we estimated the proportions in
which students from lowest and highest quintiles appropriate subsidies. We tested
the results with chi-square test; the null hypothesis was that the appropriation of
student subsidies is not sensitive to income. The references are in the third column
(percentages within the sample). The results are presented in the Table 7.
2.11 Summary of Empirical Findings
The null hypotheses consisted in afﬁrming that the proportions in which subsidies
are appropriated by each category of students deﬁned by the “equity” variables
equals the correspondent level of representation in the cohort within public














i 10–350 18.1 82.6 17.4 70.1 29.9
ii 400–555 21.4 83.4 16.6 63.1 36.9
iii 600–999 15.6 77.0 23.0 64.5 35.5
iv 1,000–1,150 22.9 84.3 15.7 56.2 43.8















i 18.1 ± 1.8 19.5 ± 1.8 0.0 24.4 ± 2.0 1.9 18.4 ± 1.8 −0.4
ii– iv 61.9 ± 2.2 63.3 ± 2.2 0.5 60.7 ± 2.2 −0.3 66.4 ± 2.2 1.2
v 22.1 ± 1.9 17.2 ± 1.7 −0.9 14.8 ± 1.6 −1.4 15.2 ± 1.6 −1.7
Chi square test
(df = 2)
χ2 = 5.172, p = 0.075,
N = 853
χ2 = 8.059, p = 0.018,
N = 858
χ2 = 9.219, p = 0.010,
N = 858
Null hypothesis Validated Rejected Rejected
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universities. For study grants the null hypothesis was conﬁrmed in relation to all
independent variables. For scholarships, the null hypothesis was validated in
relation to parents’ residence and parents’ education. The null hypothesis was
rejected for the appropriation of scholarships according to income categories. These
ﬁndings indicate there is no evidence that the current distribution pattern of study
grants and scholarships creates advantages for the categories deﬁned by the three
variables associated with family background, with a notable exception: the
appropriation of merit-based scholarships is sensitive to income. We stress again
that the income variable in our sample refers to the monthly income the students
declare and it is not comparable with the distribution of income in the overall
population. We ﬁnd important to remind that, overall, the better off categories of
population are over-represented among the students, which implies that a distri-
bution pattern which is not sensitive to the family background according to the
construction of our analysis contributes to the maintenance of the existing social
structure within the student cohort in public universities i.e. the under-representation
of the least well off categories.
The standardised residuals indicate a slight over-representation of students from
the lowest quintile amongst those who beneﬁt from merit-based scholarships and a
slight under-representation of those from the highest quintile. The low values of the
residuals (<2) requires caution in interpreting the ﬁnding as an indication of
association (Agresti 2007, 38–39). We calculated odds ratio between lowest and
middle quintile, and the highest quintile. The results are presented in the Table 8:
The odds that a student from the lowest quintile appropriates merit-based
scholarships in public universities are 1.94 higher than those for a student from the
highest quintile. The odds ratio between middle income and highest income stu-
dents (1.33) are lower that the odds ratio between the lowest and the highest income
students (1.94). If talents are evenly distributed across the population and the
wealthier ones stand more chances to beneﬁt of an environment which stimulates
learning, then this ﬁnding indicates that wealthier students could ﬁnd scholarship
less attractive than their less well off counterparts. This association is consonant
with the idea that the strength of the incentive depends on how the recipient
perceives the value of the subsidy, which raises concern regarding the efﬁciency of
merit-based scholarships in terms of motivating achievements. In fact, we esti-
mate34 that 55.9 ± 2.3 % of the students in public universities which are located in
the highest quintile declare they derive their most important share of income from
employment or self-employment, while the reference for the share of the sample
corresponding to public universities is 23.3 ± 1.9 %; for other 38.5 ± 2.2 % of the
Table 8 Appropriation of merit-based scholarships by income categories: odds ratio
Quintiles Lowest: highest Middle: highest
Odds ratio 1.94 1.33
34 The estimates are highly signiﬁcant: χ2 = 203.550, p < 0.001, N = 855, df = 6.
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students in the highest quintile we estimate that the main source of income are the
parents and relatives. We estimate that students from the lowest quintile rely mainly
on income from parents and relatives (59.8 ± 2.3 % of them) and on scholarships:
32.3 ± 2.1 %, while the reference for the corresponding share of the sample is
estimated to 11.3 ± 1.4 %. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish students whose
household belong to the lowest income category from students who enjoy only
limited ﬁnancial autonomy from their parents and relatives. This is due to the
construction of the questionnaire and it constitutes a limit of our analysis.
We used odds ratios to test the negative association between placement in
income categories and appropriation of study grants. As failure in obtaining a study
grant would result in paying tuition in a public or private university, we included in
the analysis students from both types of universities. We note that the proportions in
which students from lowest, middle and highest income quintiles appropriate study
grants differs signiﬁcantly from their level of representation in the overall student
population, public and private universities included (χ2(2) = 30.114, p < 0.001,
N = 987, null hypothesis rejected). We calculated odds ratio between lowest and
middle quintiles, and the highest one. The results are presented in the Table 9:
The odds ratio table indicates that students from the highest income quintile are
considerably less likely to appropriate study grants than their less well off cohort
fellows. On the other hand, they are considerably more likely to pay tuition fees.
The odds ratio between lowest and highest income categories (2.52) can indicate
low attractiveness of the study grants for the wealthiest students or the fact that
tuition fees represent a signiﬁcant obstacle for the students who declare the lowest
income, or both. The odds ratio between middle and highest income quintiles (2.32)
is in line with the former explanation. The comparison of the odds ratio provide
additional evidence to accredit the thesis that incentives associated with the merit
based distribution of study grants are weaker for wealthier students.
The null hypotheses are rejected for accommodation in student dormitories, in
relation to all three “equity” variables, within the share of the sample which cor-
responds to public universities. The values of the standardised residuals exceed 2 in
relation to parents’ residence and parents’ education, which indicates a signiﬁcant
discrepancy in the appropriation pattern. We calculated odds ratio between the least
well off and the better off categories deﬁned by the variables. The results are
presented in the Table 10:
The relatively low value of the odds ratio corresponding to the lowest quintile
can be explained by the fact that an important share of the students in this category
live with their parents or with relatives (44.0 ± 2.3 %), according to our estimates.
For reference, the estimated proportion of students in public universities living with
their parents or with relatives in the corresponding share of the sample amounts
Table 9 Appropriation of study grants according to income categories: odds ratios
Quintiles Lowest: highest Middle: highest
Odds ratio 2.52 2.32
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30.3 ± 2.1 %.35 If we calculate the odds that a student lives in more comfortable
facilities i.e. owning an apartment, or renting an apartment by oneself or with
others, then the association is re-established. Students from the highest quintile
stand 5.90 times more chances to live in more comfortable facilities than their
counterparts from the other end of the income spectrum (quintile i), and 2.37 times
more chances than middle income students (quintiles ii-iv). Overall, student dor-
mitories stand more chances to be inhabited by students from the least well off
categories within public universities, when they do not live with their parents or
with their relatives.
3 Conclusions
Student subsidies are recognised to serve two functions: to incentivise achievement
and to provide social support. We labelled subsidies as geared towards quality when
merit-based logic is prevalent in the associated distributive pattern; following a
similar logic, a distributive pattern which is prevalently sensitive to students’
background was categorised as indicating an orientation towards equity.
We found that merit is the staple criterion based on which subsidies were dis-
tributed in the entire post-1989 period and were still distributed as of this writing. For
study grants, distribution based on academic results constitutes the norm. Merit and
needs are associated with different types of scholarships; the value and the pro-
portion of the total budget allocated for each type of scholarship denote a net
orientation towards quality. In the past two decades the attempts to change the status
quo failed and the accepted incremental adjustments did not change the overall
orientation. In the case of study grants, salient features of past arrangements indicate
that the distribution pattern exhibits a considerable dose of path-dependence. The
proposed revision to allow for the distribution of partial study grants was neutral to
quality and equity, while allowing for more room of maneuver at the university
level; yet it did not pass. The student loan alternative which imposed in its ﬁrst
version both quality and equity thresholds did not become effective. In the case of
scholarships, the proposed revision was explicitly oriented towards ballancing
quality and equity, and this was one of the main reasons it was discarded.









1.94 1.48 1.34 1.71
35 The estimates are highly signiﬁcant: χ2 = 47.507, p < 0.001, N = 858, df = 8.
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Over the past twenty years the pool of subsidies available to students has gen-
erally grown. However, the ratio between those who appropriated the subsidies and
those who didn’t, though they were eligible, ﬂuctuated. The current provision of
study grants and accommodation facilities reﬂects capacities from a past period of
high enrolments, when efforts were made to increase capacities to cater for the
unsatisﬁed demand. The issue of efﬁciency in resource utilisation becomes stringent
in this context, especially if pressures on the public budget are to continue.
Are Romania’s talents wisely spent? The current arrangements present major
shortcomings in relation to equity in the ﬁrst place. The results of our analysis
indicate that the distribution of study grants, scholarships and accommodation
facilities in student dormitories is generally neutral to students’ family background,
which implies a marginal contribution to the overcoming of the analyzed
inequalities. The current situation represents an improvement as compared to the
early 2000s, when subsidies supported the reproduction of the social structure
within the universities, according to the conclusions of Vlăsceanu and Dima (2000),
and Pasti (1998). This evolution was not the consequence of an intentional change
of orientation - it is rather associated with the expansion of higher education and
probably with the fact that many better off families choose to send their childrens
for studies abroad.36
The evolutions discussed above are also important for the conﬁguration of
potential opponents to equity-oriented reforms within the student body. In the late
nineties, the distribution of subsidies was concentrated towards a socio-economic
elite, which, in theory, stood more chances to mobilise opposition than a hetero-
geneous and more numerous group, such as that of the beneﬁciaries of subsidies in
2011. An indication that a move towards equity may be accepted on the side of the
students is represented by the fact that an important national federation of student
organisations recently became supportive towards equity policies (ANOSR 2013).
Overall, we consider that the current context is more favourable to a shift of orientation
towards a more balanced relation between equity and quality in the public policies
regarding student subsidies than that of the late nineties. In terms of efﬁciency, a combi-
nation of merit and needs criteria could prove more rewarding from both the equity and
quality perspectives, as current arrangements present major shortcomings in both respects.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
36 The magnitude of this tendency cannot be properly assessed. The ﬁgures advanced - 22 000, 35
000 and 50 000 for 2010, are estimates by various NGO’s. See http://www.zf.ro/eveniment/cati-
studenti-romani-invata-in-strainatate-22-000-35-000-sau-50-000-6952029, accessed in October,
16th, 2013.
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